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This overview adopts a critical social science perspective to examine the state of play and 
potential futures for coal in the context of climate change. It introduces key trends in coal 
consumption, production and trade, before appraising the relevant literature. Finding 
surprisingly little literature directly focussed on coal and climate change compared with related 
fields, it appraises existing work and highlights key areas for future work. In addition to 
established bodies of work on the situated politics of coal and the political economy of coal, 
new work calling for demand side policies to be supplemented with supply side policies 
highlights the increasing importance of how normative contestations drive debates over coal, 
suggesting that future work needs to engage not only much more directly with climate change 
as an issue, but particularly with the place of coal in a just transition. Because of coal’s 
mammoth contribution to climate change and the complex political economy which drives its 
production and consumption, it is likely that coal will remain at the centre of difficult questions 
about the relationship between climate action and development for some time. 
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Introduction	
In 2015, at the same time as countries around the world were hammering out their positions in 
preparation for COP21 in Paris, global coal production declined by 2.8%. This was the largest 
fall since the International Energy Agency (IEA) began keeping records in 1971 and the second 
successive year of declining production since 13 years of constant growth had delivered the 
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highest ever coal production in 2013 (IEA, 2016a). It was immediately followed up with a 6.3% 
fall in production in 2016, confirming the trend away from coal. But despite these drops, coal 
still provides around 40% of the world’s heat and power, a proportion largely unchanged in the 
48 years of IEA records (IEA, 2018b). At COP21, the member states of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) overwhelmingly endorsed the key 
recommendations contained in the Paris Climate Agreement, the headline target of which was 
to limit global warming well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels.1 Because coal is such a 
significant energy source and the most carbon intensive and dirtiest of the fossil fuels (Gohlke 
et al., 2011), movement towards this <2ºC target will require significant reductions in coal 
production and consumption in absolute terms (Fankhauser and Jotzo, 2018; Spencer et al., 
2018). Remarkably in this context, the Paris Agreement contains no mentions of either coal or 
‘fossil fuels’ (Healy and Barry, 2017). McGlade and Ekins (2015: 187) calculate that even with 
widespread deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, “over 80 per cent 
of current coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet the target” 
(compared with just a third of oil reserves and half of gas reserves) and Johnson et al. (2015: 
100) argue that it would require “the complete phase-out of coal-based electricity generation 
without CCS by 2050”. This means that shifts in the coal trade or in public opinion over coal 
have amplified significance, since the future of the global climate is inextricably linked with 
the future of coal.  
This overview is guided by the overarching question ‘What is the future of coal in the context 
of climate change?’ Of course, to understand the future of coal requires understanding the 
history of coal. Barbara Freese’s magisterial Coal: A Human History (2005) opens with the 
summer of 1306, when the English nobility descending on London for Parliament found the air 
so toxic as a result of the burning of coal that they sought to ban the practice. The world would 
have been a very different place had their attempts been successful, but they were not, and her 
investigations led her to the conclusion that “a deep, rich vein of coal runs through human 
history and underlies many of the hardest decisions our world now faces” (Freese, 2005: 9). 
These decisions—Freese observed—concerned the climate, and particularly how it was 
changing in the face of massive consumption of coal and other fossil fuels. Modernity itself is 
coal-powered. William Cavert’s environmental history of early modern London focusses on 
how “burning coal became an essential aspect of London life, a vital component, so it seemed 
to contemporaries, of social stability, commercial progress, and state power” (Cavert, 2016: 
16). John Urry (2014) argues it was the emergence of coal-fired power that sent the non-fossil 
fuelled Chinese and Indian economies into decline in from the 18th century. Coal, in other 
words, was deeply embedded in social, political and economic life long before industrialisation 
began to demand ever-increasing supplies of coal in ever-more concentrated channels of energy 
flow.  
With industrialisation, though, the quantities of coal required were so large that transporting 
and burning it required large numbers of workers concentrated in particular places. This, 
combined with the significance of the product, gave these workers new political power which 
shaped the emergence of a new mass politics (Mitchell, 2009, 2013; see also Urry, 2014). So 
                                               
1 As of November 2017, all UNFCCC member states had signed the agreement, though the USA has given 
notification that it intends to withdraw. 
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coal emerges as a particular paradox, because it “both enables contemporary patterns of 
development and yet, by producing climate change, threatens that development” (Goodman et 
al., 2016: 180). This means that positioning oneself against coal—particularly from the rich 
countries—“can easily be portrayed as to be pro-poverty or even racist, the obsession of the 
Western environmentalist happy to kick away the ladder to levels of economic prosperity that 
they themselves enjoy” (Tyfield, 2014: 69; see also Kartha et al., 2018). It is no surprise that 
this ‘equity’ rationale has consistently underpinned both domestic climate politics in coal-
dependent developing countries such as India (Dubash, 2013, 2017), and been explicitly 
deployed in international fora, such as by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his remarks at the 
opening of COP21 in Paris in November 2015.2  
To understand the future of coal requires an understanding of the trends in consumption, 
production and trade. The paper starts with these, drawing centrally on new analysis of IEA 
statistics, in the context of the broader literature. This reveals that Asia will determine the future 
of coal, and that despite the fact that China’s actions outweigh any others, that India is emerging 
as a pivotal player. In particular, the dynamic between Indian demand and Australian supply 
could determine whether the Paris Agreement target of well below 2°C is achievable. The 
balance of the paper turns to the scholarly literature, drawing out key themes of work focussing 
specifically on coal and drawing connections with related literatures. The astute reader will 
notice that many (though by no means all) of the examples focus on either India or Australia. 
This is deliberate, since these countries will play a decisive role in the future of coal, and the 
relationship between them illuminates some of the key areas where research is required, 
including the role of coal in the global energy mix, the links between coal use and development, 
and the particularly pressing question of what implications the changing geographies of coal 
trade and the transition away from coal have for socio-environmental and climate justice. 
Producing,	consuming	and	trading	coal	in	a	climate-changed	world	
The IEA’s annual Coal Information report remains the most authoritative source of information 
about the state of the global coal industry, combining both key statistics and important time-
series data on coal and coal-derivative products (IEA, 2018b). For readers interested in the 
drivers of change in the coal market, including emerging trends and subnational shifts in 
production, consumption or trade, the IEA also publishes an annual Market Report Series: Coal 
(most recently, IEA, 2018a),3 which contains much more detailed analysis of both recent trends 
and forecasts over a 5-year timeframe. As a balance to the coal industry-dominated projections 
from the IEA, the CoalSwarm ‘Global Coal Plant Tracker’ seeks to identify, map and describe 
every known coal plant larger than 30MW in capacity (Nace, 2018).4  
Before we can examine the coal trade, though, it is important to understand the types and uses 
of coal. Coal and coal-products are used for a variety of purposes, but the two key uses of coal 
are (a) the generation of electricity and heat; and (b) as an input to the production of iron, mainly 
for steel production. In the first case, energy is extracted from the expanding gases (mostly 
steam) produced by burning the coal and transformed into electricity and heat. There are myriad 
                                               
2  https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/26071/  
3 Between 2011 and 2016 this series was published as the Medium Term Coal Market Report series. 
4 https://endcoal.org/global-coal-plant-tracker/  
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different grades of coal used for this application, but broadly speaking they are broken down 
into two categories: ‘black’ or ‘hard’ coal (with a higher energy content of >5732kcal/kg) and 
‘brown’ coal’ (with a lower energy content of <5732kcal/kg). ‘Lignite’ is a form of brown coal 
with a particularly low energy content of <4777kcal/kg (IEA, 2018b). In the first case, coal is 
generally pulverised then burned. The heat generated turns water in tubes lining the boiler to 
steam, the pressure of which turns turbines. These turbines generate electricity by the magnetic 
coupling created by the rotation of these wire-coils.5 In the second case, raw coal is first baked 
at high temperatures to remove impurities and create a fuel with a high carbon content known 
as ‘coke’, which is then burned in a blast furnace along with iron ore to produce iron. Because 
coal is frequently used to power the initial coke-making process, it therefore provides both the 
chemical agent (carbon monoxide) and the heat required to convert iron ore to iron.6 Coke is 
also used as the primary fuel in the kilns used to produce cement. Like with coal for electricity 
and heat, different grades of coal are used, but because coal for coke production must be low in 
ash, sulphur and phosphorus, as well as strong enough to produce a coke that can hold the 
weight of the iron ore in the blast furnace, it is more uniform in quality than steam coal. This 
coal is referred to as ‘coking’ coal in IEA publications, and often referred to as ‘metallurgical’ 
coal elsewhere. When combined, ‘steam coal’, ‘coking coal’ and ‘lignite’ are often referred to 
as ‘primary coal’. 
Coal consumption 
Understanding the purposes for which coal is used, the first consideration is where coal 
consumption takes place. The IEA tends to report coal consumption in energy-equivalent 
terms,7 and in such terms China has been the world’s largest consumer of coal for three decades, 
having surpassed the consumption of the USA in 1987. To put China’s consumption in 
perspective, growth in Chinese consumption from 29.2% of global consumption in 2000 to 
52.2% in 2013 almost singlehandedly drove global coal consumption to its highest ever levels 
in 2013, and China has accounted for ~50% of the world’s coal consumption ever since. In 
2016, China’s consumption was still over five times that of India, the second largest consumer.8 
Coal consumption is also highly concentrated amongst a small group of countries. In 2016, the 
Top 10 coal consuming nations accounted for 86% of global consumption, and Figure 1 
highlights them along with historical data that helps contextualise their consumption relative to 
important UNFCCC dates including the 1990 ‘baseline’ against which emissions reductions are 
gauged.   
 
                                               
5 https://www.worldcoal.org/coal/uses-coal/coal-electricity  
6 https://www.worldcoal.org/coal/uses-coal/how-steel-produced  
7 The IEA expresses coal consumption statistics both in volumetric terms (Million tonnes or Mt) and in terms of 
an energy unit (Million tonnes of coal equivalent or Mtce) derived from calorific values supplied by the 
producing nations to facilitate comparisons between different energy sources because the energy content of coal 
varies according to its type and source. 1Tce = 7,000,000 kcal. Because higher quality coal produces more 
energy per kilogram, a higher Mtce:Mt ratio indicates a higher proportion of higher quality coal in the mix. 
Some typical conversion factors to kgce can be found at 
https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/coalequivalent.htm. 
8 India became the world’s second largest coal consumer in energy terms in 2015, having overtaken the USA in 
volumetric terms a year earlier in 2014. 
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Figure 1: Historical consumption of the top 10 coal consuming countries in 2016. Based on IEA data 
from Coal Information © OECD/IEA 2018, www.iea.org/statistics. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c; as 
modified by G.A.S. Edwards. 
If the overall proportion of the world’s heat and power derived from coal has remained rather 
constant since the IEA started keeping records, over the same period the geography of coal 
consumption has been consistently shifting towards Asia, particularly non-OECD Asia. In part, 
this is merely a function of population and economic growth (Steckel et al., 2015), exacerbated 
by globalization and the global division of labour which further shifts energy consumption into 
the developing world (Clark et al., 2012). This shift has been led by China and India, which in 
2016 together consumed over 60% of the world’s primary coal.9 Despite the historical 
significance of consumption in the USA, in reality its consumption has been in almost constant 
decline since the turn of the 21st century, and it is China and India that will determine the future 
of coal (Thurber and Morse, 2015; Tyfield, 2014). China and India also have the most 
significant ‘infrastructural inertia’— already committed emissions—because the coal power 
plants in both countries are considerably ‘younger’ than those in the developed world, and thus 
have more of their useable life remaining (Davis et al., 2010; Edenhofer et al., 2018).  
Despite China’s overwhelming influence, the pivot has begun to swing towards India (Sahu et 
al., 2017; Meng et al., 2018). China recorded its third successive year of falling consumption 
in 2016 and has explicitly set targets to cap coal consumption by 2020 (Spencer et al., 2018). 
By contrast, in 2016 India recorded its 18th successive year of successive growth in coal 
consumption, around 60% of which is used to generate electricity. The IEA forecasts Indian 
consumption to continue growing by 3.3%pa between 2017-2022, underpinning the global coal 
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market for the next 5 years at least, and for non-OECD Asia to be the key growth region over 
the next two decades as rising living standards, industrialization and economic development 
programmes drive growth in energy consumption (IEA, 2017: 84; see also Froggatt, 2013; 
Morse, 2012; Sahu et al., 2017; Thurber, 2019). Some commentators consider the IEA 
projections to be overstated (e.g. Sartor, 2018), but the growing influence of India is not in 
dispute, nor is the fact that “the success of the Paris Agreement and international climate 
mitigation efforts may therefore depend on curtailing growth of coal-based energy and 
emissions in now-industrializing and urbanizing countries” (Meng et al., 2018: 5). 
Coal production 
A similar pattern of coal concentration emerges in the production sphere. The three largest coal 
consumers—China, India, and the USA—are also the three largest coal producers, and the Top 
10 coal producers account for 91% of the worlds production (Figure 2). As with consumption, 
it was the influence of China which drove global coal production to its peak in 2013 and global 
production has been declining since then, with the 460Mt decline recorded in 2016 the largest 
absolute fall (IEA, 2017). Some countries notably buck the general trend towards reduced 
production since 2013. India and Russia have registered increases in production every year, and 
Australia increased production every year except 2016 (Figure 2). Overall, the most recent 
figures show that coal production remains over 60% higher than it was in 2000 (IEA, 2018b). 
 
 
Figure 2: Historical production of the top 10 coal consuming countries in 2016. Based on IEA data 
from Coal Information © OECD/IEA 2018, www.iea.org/statistics. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c; as 
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The coal trade 
The consumption and production data just presented show a pattern of ‘coal countries’: the top 
10 coal producing countries produce 91% of the world’s coal and also consume 81% in 
volumetric terms. Only Japan and Korea are in the top 10 coal consumers without being 
significant producers too. But in a climate change context there are two important trends to 
note. Firstly, the coal trade is dominated by demand for power and heat rather than steel 
production or industrial processes. Steam coal and lignite consistently accounting for more than 
three-quarters of the coal trade. Secondly, Australia and Indonesia dominate the international 
coal trade. Together they were the source of 57.4% of coal exports in 2016 (29.3% from 
Australia and 28.1% from Indonesia), and both export more than twice as much coal as Russia, 
consistently the third largest exporter (IEA, 2018b). In 2015 Australia also once again overtook 
Indonesia to become the world’s largest coal exporter, regaining a position it had previously 
held from 1984 to 2010 (IEA, 2016a). Australia and Indonesia are also the most export-oriented 
coal producers in the world by a considerable margin, with 77.8% of Australian and 80.4% of 
Indonesian coal exported in 2016, and both are favourably located for export into the same 
Asian export market which is the destination for 70.8% of global imports (Figure 3) (Oei and 
Mendelevitch, 2019). Import forecasts are highly volatile. In 2016, the IEA’s 5-year forecast 
was for Indian imports to grow at 3% per year (IEA, 2016b: 93); a year later the forecast had 
been revised to a decline of 3.6% per year (IEA, 2017: 104). But, as discussed above, this does 
not dampen the consensus that non-OECD Asia in general and India in particular are key to the 
future fortunes of coal. 
 
 
       (a)                (b) 
Figure 3: Major coal (a) exporters and (b) importers in 2016. Based on IEA data from Coal Information 
© OECD/IEA 2018, www.iea.org/statistics. Licence: www.iea.org/t&c; as modified by G.A.S. 
Edwards. Useful visualisations of the global coal trade both by weight and value based on UN 
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Key trends in coal consumption, production and trade 
In overall terms, the global story of coal as an energy source is one of stasis. Coal remains the 
most abundant, most widespread and most easily extracted fossil fuel around the world, and has 
been the source of ~40% of the world’s heat and power for over 40 years (IEA, 2018b). Coal is 
also supported by a powerful and well-resourced political-economic complex (Bell and York, 
2012; see also Huber, 2009; Tyfield, 2014; Urry, 2014). But just beneath the surface, it is clear 
that the international political economy of coal is undergoing significant change in the context 
of climate change. Many advanced industrial countries have shifted towards deliberate phase-
outs of coal as an energy source and at the same time years of technological development and 
greatly enhanced investment in the renewable energy sector is beginning to deliver the reduced 
costs and increased reliability of supply which has so far helped ensure coal, gas or nuclear 
energy generation remained the go-to options for baseload power generation.  
However, coal remains on the ascendency amidst a group of developing and extraction-oriented 
countries, particularly in the ‘Pacific Basin’ coal market focussed on Asia and Oceania (Thurber 
and Morse, 2015). China will dominate coal production and consumption in absolute terms for 
the foreseeable future, and as such its policies will be significant drivers of the fortunes of coal. 
But indications are that despite China’s mammoth coal production and consumption figures, a 
gradual decline in coal is much more likely there than any growth (Spencer et al., 2018). By 
contrast, coal consumption is rapidly growing in Asia generally and the Indian subcontinent 
particularly. India is emerging as a key driver of coal demand, and coal in India is not just a 
means to an end; it is also associated with the very idea of India as a modernising, industrialising 
country (Lahiri-Dutt, 2014). India’s absolute demand for coal and its policies for sourcing it 
will be a major factor driving production decisions in Australia and Indonesia, the world’s two 
biggest coal exporters (Rosewarne, 2016), with potentially catastrophic consequences for the 
global climate system (McGlade and Ekins, 2015; Meng et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018).  
A recent report argued that it was realistic to envisage a global transition away from coal by 
2050 (Sartor, 2018). But this will require significant political will and rapid action, neither of 
which history gives reason to be confident about. Concluding a historical appraisal of coal in 
Australia, Duus argues that “Considering the largely aligned objectives of the state and mining 
interests, deep change is unlikely to be initiated by governments or industry at the current time” 
(Duus, 2013: 106), and the same can be said for India (Lahiri-Dutt, 2016). The discursive 
representation of coal in India today is strongly reminiscent of coal’s central role in the 
emergence of industrial modernity, with its associated political and social structures (Freese, 
2005; Tyfield, 2014), mirroring the experience in other ‘coal countries’ such as Poland (Kuchler 
and Bridge, 2018). In arguing that modern democracy was built on coal until the mid 20th 
century, and thereafter on oil, Mitchell (2013) captured something essential about the symbiotic 
relationship between fossil fuel exploitation and modern democratic capitalism. But perhaps he 
overstated the demise of coal, which some scholars have argued is currently experiencing a 
remarkable renaissance (Edenhofer et al., 2018; Steckel et al., 2015). The relationship between 
India and Australia is notable for capturing open questions surrounding the role of coal in the 
global energy mix, the links between coal use and development, and the under-researched 
question of what implications the changing geographies of coal trade and the transition away 
from coal have for socio-environmental and climate justice. 
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Appraising	the	literature	
What then, should research on coal in the context of climate change focus on? In this section, I 
consider the existing literature and seek to sketch out some productive avenues for future 
research. To get a sense of the literature on coal and climate change, a series of searches were 
conducted in both Google Scholar and the Web of Science (WOS) Core Collection (Table 1), 
following Haddaway et al.’s (2015) methodology which supplemented existing techniques for 
systematic reviews with a Google Scholar title search to increase the grey literature coverage. 
The most narrow search—for sources with both “coal” and “climate change” in the title (Search 
1 in Table 1)—yielded only 221 sources on Google Scholar and 28 sources on WOS. By 
contrast, “fossil fuel” (Search 5) generated 7030 and 1445 results respectively, and “climate 
change” (Search 6) generated ~242,000 and 41,067 results respectively.  
Table 1: Results of a search on Google Scholar and Web of Science for key words in the title and 
[full text] of published literature, conducted 13 December 2018.  
Search	Term10	 Google	Scholar	sources	 Web	of	Science	sources	
1. coal AND “climate change” 221 [~581,000] 28 [2,341] 
2. coal AND climate 602 [~1,930,000] 105 [4,411] 
3. low AND carbon AND 
transition 
1050 [~4,150,000] 343 [21,856] 
4. climate AND justice 2350 [~2,210,000] 426 [3,117] 
5. “fossil fuel” 7030 [~1,010,000] 1445 [15,831] 
6. “climate change” ~242,000 [~2,440,000] 41,067 [224,456] 
 
Though this is a rather crude measure, it was notable just how little literature there is which 
explicitly focusses on coal and climate change, particularly given the significance of coal in 
driving climate change historically and constraining climate change responses in the present. 
Most of the social science literature engages with coal only indirectly, inasmuch as coal is 
relevant to other economic, environmental and political questions such as resource extraction, 
energy policy or climate policy. Indeed, this journal has never previously published a paper 
with “coal” in its title or keywords, and has published only two articles where coal was 
mentioned in the abstract; the national reviews on Poland and Australia (Kundzewicz and 
Matczak, 2012; Head et al., 2014).  
Because the relevant literature is so diverse, parsing and organising it is challenging. I have 
therefore arranged this section to highlight five areas for research which I think should be 
prominent in considering the future of coal in the context of climate change.  I start by 
considering existing work on (1) the locally situated politics of coal and (2) the political 
economy of coal. Taken together, these bodies of work establish why coal politics are so central 
to climate policy, and how coal fits into political and economic structures. I then turn to two 
literatures which envision very different futures for coal: (3) the emergent literature on supply-
side climate policy, which is concerned with stimulating a rapid and transformative shift away 
from coal, and (4) more briefly the literature on Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), which sees 
                                               
10 Google Scholar searches used the form [allintitle:Search Term] while WOS searches used the form 
[TI=(Search Term)]. 
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a substantial future for coal. In both of these literatures—the areas where coal and climate 
change are most frequently articulated together—it becomes clear that normative questions are 
always either latent or patent on work on coal and climate change. So finally, (5) I turn to the 
place of coal in a ‘just transition’, what climate justice means for coal, and what coal means for 
climate justice. The future of coal is central to any proposal for a just transition and any attempt 
to achieve climate justice, because of the historical significance of coal in driving climate 
change, the shifting geographies of coal production and consumption, and the issue of carbon 
entanglement. But though justice crops up everywhere in debates about coal, the connections 
between the issues raised in the other bodies of literature require an explicit justice lens. I 
conclude with some areas for future research.  
1. The locally situated politics of coal: from livelihoods and health to divestment  
There is a fairly long-standing body of work from disciplines including sociology, 
anthropology, geography and social movement studies which focusses on largely local-scale 
contests over the extraction and use of coal. In Australia, for example, scholars have focussed 
on environmental conflicts over coal infrastructure, notably in the Hunter Valley of NSW (see 
Connor et al., 2009; Higginbotham et al., 2010), or on associated negative health impacts of 
coal mines or combustion (Morrice and Colagiuri, 2013). Climate change is not particularly 
prominent in this work, perhaps partly because conflicts emerged before climate change rose to 
prominence. In Australia, for instance, conflicts developed in the 1980s between coal mining 
and agriculture (Duus, 2013), and McManus and Connor (2013) noted that in this context, rural 
residents were much more likely to focus on the local environmental damage caused by coal 
mines than on larger tropes such as climate change or climate justice. This finding is 
corroborated in coal-using regions such as in Alberta, Canada, where ‘health’ was the primary 
mobilizing frame used to promote a phase-out of coal-fired electricity (Lysack, 2015) and in 
other cases where delicate constituencies needed to be constructed between interest groups who 
have historically been in conflict themselves, such as environmental groups, agricultural 
landholders, and indigenous groups (see Piggot, 2018 for one example). Methodologically, 
discourse analysis—frequently of media coverage—has proven a popular tool for this work, 
which often focusses on how coal is represented by its proponents and opponents, (McManus, 
2000; Bacon and Nash, 2012; Ayling, 2017). Findings often point to political economic 
explanations for local conflicts or highlight normative discourses about justice and morality 
structuring the debate. For instance, Connor et al. (2009) understand contests over the Anvil 
Hill coal mine in NSW’s Hunter Valley in terms of Bourdieu’s concept of ‘social fields’, to 
“analyse the ways in which local conflicts over coal mine developments have become 
incorporated into the climate change agenda of transnational environmental organisations” 
(Connor et al., 2009: 492). They find in their case that moral framings have favoured the 
opponents of mining—particularly as the science of climate change was increasingly 
accepted—leading the proponents to deploy tactics including the use of “industry-sponsored 
science to discredit opponents’ views about climate change” (Connor et al., 2009: 506). Some 
of the more explicitly climate-change focused work in this vein has analysing the effectiveness 
of climate advocacy amongst the third sector and social movements, using coal conflicts as the 
empirical foil for the analysis (e.g. Hall and Taplin, 2008; McAllister, 2009; Evans and Phelan, 
2016). Sometimes, the studies adopt an overt normative position against coal. For instance, in 
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introducing their special issue of Organization & Environment (2012), Bell and York build on 
Daniel Faber’s (2008) notion of a ‘polluter-industrial complex’ to observe that “the biggest 
corporate polluters have a stranglehold on democracy in the United States and abroad” (Bell 
and York, 2012: 364) and suggest that “Working with local environmental justice groups to 
create activist research projects for our students is one way to fight the Polluter-Industrial 
Complex” (Bell and York, 2012: 365). 
Work on the fossil fuel divestment movement (FFDM) has more consistently framed contests 
over coal as normative conflicts, perhaps because as Seidman argues, “In most divestment 
campaigns, institutional divestment is not the ultimate goal; activists’ broader aim is to spark a 
sense of moral urgency and support for strong intervention” (Seidman, 2015: 1029). Though its 
genesis lies in a campaign by North American students for their colleges to divest from coal 
stocks in 2011 (Ayling and Gunningham, 2017), the FFDM literature has tended to focus more 
on oil than coal. In one coal-focussed study, though, Ayling analyses media releases from the 
Australian Coal Association and Minerals Council of Australia and 350.org Australia between 
2013 and 2016, arguing that they reveal a contest of legitimacy between the coal lobby and 
climate movement, in which “each party attempts to represent itself as deserving the grant of 
cognitive, moral, pragmatic, and legal legitimacy” (Ayling, 2017: 362). Indeed, Healy and 
Barry (2017) argue that FFDM is an issue which brings together work from diverse literatures 
on supply side climate policy, the just transition, and climate and energy justice. Taken together, 
this literature provides a rich basis for further studies which more explicitly frame coal conflicts 
in terms of climate change, either adopting a social movement focus. 
2. The political economy of coal 
Whereas work discussed in the previous section focusses on mainly specific cases and contests, 
contextualising it either theoretically or empirically with broader political economic structures, 
work on the political economy of coal has sought to understand how coal fits into political and 
economic structures in the context of globalisation. IEA reports aside, Thurber and Morse’s 
(2015) edited collection The Global Coal Market: Supplying the Major Fuel for Emerging 
Economies remains the most comprehensive treatment of the global coal trade, and even it 
(understandably) limits itself primarily to the ‘Pacific Basin’ trade. Thurber’s very recently 
published monograph Coal aims for a more expansive treatment (Thurber, 2019). There is a 
growing body of literature which seeks to situate coal production and consumption within 
broader political economic contexts. For instance, Burton et al. (2018) and Strambo et al. (2018) 
connect the politics of coal subsidies with the broader political context for coal extraction in 
South Africa and Colombia respectively, and Baer (2016) shows how longstanding and 
bipartisan political support for the Australian coal industry is. Finally, Lahiri-Dutt shows that 
in India, coal is both deeply linked to the nation’s sense of itself and caught up in the capitalist 
state agenda (Lahiri-Dutt, 2014), but also underpins at least four different economies and 
myriad livelihoods, each of which “is governed by different sets of norms and values” (Lahiri-
Dutt, 2016: 210). 
But explicitly cross-national political economy analyses are less common, and every few 
explicitly situate their analysis in the context of climate change. In many ways, Stuart 
Rosewarne’s contribution to a broader project investigating coal transitions in India, Australia 
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and Germany (Goodman et al., 2016) is the most salient. Linking India’s economic 
development agenda to Australia’s extractivist one, he proposes that proposed coal export 
projects from Australia to India represent a fusion of regimes of accumulation, and starts to 
unpack the discourses supporting this political-economic pivot (Rosewarne, 2016). Two other 
examples of this kind of analysis are Cardoso and Turhan’s (2018) study of the South-South 
coal trade between Colombia and Turkey and Healy et al.’s (2019) work examining the 
connection between coal extraction in Colombia and production in Pennsylvania. The former 
makes a strong argument that the ‘energyscapes’ created by the trade between Colombia and 
Turkey “are anchored in socio-ecological injustices associated with mining and coal 
consumption, as well as in the profound tensions between public health, economic gain, and 
political power in these two increasingly linked countries” (Cardoso and Turhan, 2018: 406). 
The latter highlights the “accountability deficit” that transboundary fossil fuel supply chains 
frequently exhibit, arguing that this necessitates a greater focus  on ‘embodied energy injustice’ 
(Healy et al., 2019: 231).  
More of these kinds of analysis are urgently needed, as is work which links political economic 
connections over coal to climate change action or inaction. Here a natural initial focus would 
be on the countries which dominate the global coal trade: China, India, Australia, Indonesia, 
Russia, and to a smaller extent Colombia and South Africa. Connections could also be 
developed to the literature on the changing geographies of resource extraction in the context of 
economic liberalisation (e.g. Bridge, 2004), which has more recently analysed the emergence 
of ‘resource nationalism’ and ‘neo-extractivism,’ both of which see control over resources and 
the proceeds of export-oriented extractivism as intrinsic to economic development and—in the 
latter case—wealth redistribution (Rosales, 2013; Burchardt and Dietz, 2014; Childs, 2016; 
Childs and Hearn, 2016). To date little of this broader ‘resource geographies’ literature has 
focussed on coal, and Bridge observed that “there have been very few efforts by geographers 
to think about the logics of care and responsibility associated with fossil fuels” (Bridge, 2011: 
828), despite the fact that climate change can be understood “as fundamentally a problem of 
carbon mobilization” (Bridge, 2011: 829–830). 
3. Shifting the focus from demand to supply: motivating coal transitions 
This geographical literature on resource politics shares with the climate policy literature a focus 
on the consumption of resources rather than their production. In the climate policy literature 
this manifests itself in a near universal focus on the question of how to curtail demand for fossil 
fuels (and a strong implicit bias towards the use of cap and trade mechanisms). However, in the 
absence of a worldwide, legally enforced, emissions trading regime, demand-side policies on 
their own actually incentivise behaviours which hamper transitions, which Sinn (2008) terms 
the ‘green paradox’. The first is the non-participation in cap and trade mechanisms of fossil fuel 
producers and exporters, on the grounds that such actors are at an inherent disadvantage 
(Richter et al., 2018; e.g. Siegmeier et al., 2018). The second is increased production and over-
extraction of fossil fuels even in relation to the pareto optimality principle, on the grounds that 
the effective life of their assets is being shortened, and therefore their profits stand to decline 
successively over time (Sinn, 2008). Sinn proposed “time-invariant unit taxes on carbon 
extraction and source taxes on capital income” as “feasible policy options” to flatten the carbon 
supply curve (Sinn, 2008: 388). In other words, he said climate policy should focus on the 
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supply side as well as the demand side. The paradox is particularly acute in the case of coal, 
because many of the environmental and social costs of coal are externalised, so its effective 
‘price’ is in the order of one third its true cost (Epstein et al., 2011). So it is unsurprising that 
the economist Bård Harstad’s (2012) straightforward proposal that “purchasing fossil-fuel 
deposits, with the intention of preserving them, may be the best possible climate policy” (p. 79) 
came in a paper entitled ‘Buy Coal!’.  
Since Harstad’s proposal, a small but growing body of literature has sought to develop the case 
for ‘supply side’ climate policies, based on the emerging consensus that any hope of limiting 
global warming to ‘well below’ 2°C—let alone more recent calls for 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018)—will 
require leaving significant known fossil fuel reserves unburned (Davis et al., 2010; Collier and 
Venables, 2014; McGlade and Ekins, 2015; Johnson et al., 2015; Spencer et al., 2018). Perhaps 
because such a significant coal transition is required so fast (McGlade and Ekins, 2015; Johnson 
et al., 2015), a significant proportion of this literature focusses explicitly on coal, including the 
vast majority of recent special issue on ‘Fossil fuel supply and climate policy’ in Climatic 
Change, where all but two of the eight papers either focussed exclusively on coal or drew 
heavily on examples related to coal, and the case was made for a range of supply side options, 
from export and production taxes to subsidy removal and moratoria on new coal developments 
(Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018; Mendelevitch, 2018; Richter et al., 2018; Green and Denniss, 
2018; Blondeel and Van de Graaf, 2018; Spencer et al., 2018).  
Importantly, though such proponents of supply-side climate policies think they offer several 
key advantages over ‘demand side’ policies such as carbon taxes and emissions pricing and 
trading schemes generally, they generally do not think economic pressure alone will be 
sufficient to generate the emissions reductions required for 2°C. Collier and Venables make this 
point explicit when they argued that economic pressure would need to be supplemented with 
moral pressure, since “The closure of the global coal industry requires a series of decisions by 
politicians and coal-mining companies which are not currently in their interest” (Collier and 
Venables, 2014: 494). They propose  a sequenced approach to closing the coal industry as a 
way to generate the required economic and moral pressures, starting with the USA, Australia 
and Germany, followed by Russia and Poland, then China and South Africa, and finally 
Indonesia and India (Collier and Venables, 2014: 506). A complementary policy option—a coal 
export safeguard regime, in which exporters leverage their positions to regulate global usage of 
coal—has been proposed by Martin. However, like Collier and Venables’ sequenced closure 
proposal such a policy would need a “broad coalition” of the major exporters, listed as 
“Indonesia, Australia, Russia, Colombia, South Africa, the United States, and Kazakhstan” 
(Martin, 2014: 598), and he concludes that the most that can be hoped for is that these exporters 
to begin to regulate exports based on the anticipated end-uses of that coal, and that even this 
“compromise position” would require “sustained national and international pressure to halt all 
coal exports” (Martin, 2014: 605). Without significant enough buy in from major coal 
producers, even the proponents observe that they fall foul of Sinn’s ‘green paradox’ (Collier 
and Venables, 2014). For a very recent contribution which explicitly examines the justice 
implications of supply-side mechanisms, see Le Billion and Kristofferson (2019). 
Given that a number of the key participants in any such ‘coalition of the willing’ have 
consistently ignored and even obstructed multilateral climate negotiations, these proposals 
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appear susceptible to criticisms that they are simply politically infeasible. One major barrier to 
action is what the OECD’s Secretary-General in 2013 called the problem of ‘carbon 
entanglement’;11 the deep ties between the state and fossil fuel industry due to the organised, 
capital and asset intensive nature of production (Piggot, 2018; Lahiri-Dutt, 2014; Baer, 2016; 
Thomson, 2017; Green and Denniss, 2018; Lazarus and van Asselt, 2018; Blondeel and Van de 
Graaf, 2018; Kuchler and Bridge, 2018). When it mobilises politically, the coal industry is a 
force to be reckoned with, (for an example drawn from Germany, see Leipprand and Flachsland, 
2018; for one from Australia, see Muenstermann, 2012). However, despite questions about its 
feasibility, the proposal to use supply side mechanisms to rapidly transition away from coal is 
an important topic for further research, for at least two reasons. Firstly, because it raises 
important questions about coal finance and the economic, political and social networks which 
influence it. To date, there is very little academic literature that closely examines this question. 
But secondly, the invocation of the normative benefits of supply side policy options—
something not comprehensively covered by the existing climate ethics literature (Kartha et al., 
2018)—is reminiscent of the prominence of normative discourses observed in the literature on 
the locally situated politics of coal, both in an analytical sense and as a normative commitment. 
4. ‘Clean’ coal is a distraction, but studying it is revealing 
Before moving on to discuss coal’s place in a ‘just transition’ what climate justice means for 
coal, we should briefly pause to consider the question of CCS and ‘clean coal’ (Tyfield, 2014). 
A special issue in Global Environmental Change provides a good entry point into the debate 
about CCS (Bäckstrand et al., 2011), which is frequently mooted by proponents of coal as a 
technological solution that provides ‘pollution free’ coal-fired energy to either avert the need 
for a transition or at the very least facilitate a more just transition (Knights and Hood, 2009; 
Morse, 2012), CCS has foundered in practice, with just one plant in operation (Markusson et 
al., 2017). Moreover, technical modelling of the potential of CCS consistently concludes that 
its ability to significantly reduce radiative forcing is heavily dependent on it being rapidly 
implemented at scale (Davis et al., 2010; Sathre and Masanet, 2012; Myhrvold and Caldeira, 
2012; Haftendorn et al., 2012; Sathre et al., 2017), and even if this implementation at scale 
were achieved, CO2 is just one of the pollutants produced by coal combustion which contribute 
to radiative forcing (Shindell and Faluvegi, 2010). This suggests that Markusson et al. (2012) 
were correct to argue that carbon pricing alone would never generate sufficient incentive for 
CCS. Indeed, recent research argues that solar photovoltaic (PV) installations would be 
preferable to carbon-neutral coal-fired electricity on a suite of criteria including energy 
generation, GHG emissions, and even land use (Groesbeck and Pearce, 2018). So far from a 
‘transition’ technology, CCS can be seen as “a spatio-temporal fix. It would offer opportunities 
for investment, and so potentially be a response to not only the ongoing climate crisis, but also 
the financial one” (Markusson et al., 2017: 4). Further research on CCS would be beneficial, 
particularly from a discursive perspective, such as recent work which has examined CCS 
technologies and discourses from an ethical perspective (Kuch, 2017). As Tyfield (2014: 68) 
argues, “Coal will be a, or even the, key energy resource as low-carbon transition slowly 
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unfolds. ‘Clean coal’ thus provides a particularly insightful window on the interdependent near-
future emergence of energy and power regimes.” 
5. Coal’s place in a ‘just transition,’ what climate justice means for coal, and what coal 
means for climate justice 
Justice has emerged as a major theme and point of contention in work on coal in the context of 
climate change. Like in other literatures, justice emerges both as an object of analysis and 
something of a normative commitment on the part of scholars; a means to an end and an end in 
itself (Edwards, 2015). Lazarus and van Asselt (2018: 4) see “moral pressure” and “public 
support for climate action” as inextricably interlinked outcomes generated by implementation 
of supply-side policies; Pearse argued a decade ago that to most Australian voters “the quality 
and morality of Australia’s emission cuts does matter a great deal” (Pearse, 2009: 58), and 
Green argued that bans on fossil fuel exploitation “send a clear signal that practices of large-
scale fossil fuel exploitation are categorically wrong, and implicitly cast aspersions on the moral 
character of actors who engage in such practices” (Green, 2018b: 449). On the other side of the 
ledger, as social movements, civil society groups and scholars have increased moral pressure 
on the coal industry, it has increasingly started to formulate normative counter-arguments 
(Ayling, 2017; Jamieson, 2017; Green, 2018a; see e.g. Knights and Hood, 2009). Writing in the 
American context, Seidman recounts how the coal magnate Charles Koch framed the issue: 
Koch warned conservative audiences that if they want to shape national policy, they 
need to put forward their own moral claims to counter those being put forward by 
environmentalists. “History demonstrates that when the American people get 
motivated by an issue of justice that they believe is just, extraordinary things can be 
accomplished,” Koch told conservative backers. (Seidman, 2015: 1033) 
Scholars interested in coal in the context of climate change will therefore need to engage with 
the growing literature on the ‘just transition’, which blends insights from political economy, 
environmental justice, climate ethics and social movements studies. The literature has also 
notably broadened in recent years from one focussed on the implications of transitions for 
workers to one much more engaged with larger political economic and ethical questions 
concerning the links between climate change policy and sustainable development (Goodman, 
2009; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Routledge et al., 2018). But they will also need to engage 
much more directly and substantively with the literature on climate justice (a good entry point 
here is Heyward and Roser, 2016), because questions of how much coal can be used, where it 
can be used and when it can be used will always be posed in the context of broader debates 
about who has responsibility for climate change action, and what this responsibility means in 
practice.  
It is well understood that the UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility 
and respective capabilities’—though admirable in intent—is in many senses a veneer of 
agreement hiding from view the intractable question of how to gain political will to limit climate 
change whilst also responding to pressing issues of poverty and underdevelopment (du Pont 
and Meinshausen, 2018; Dubash, 2017; Kartha et al., 2018). But as one of the most significant 
sources of both historical and current greenhouse gas emissions, abstract questions about 
responsibility for climate action and climate rights are given very material substance when 
Edwards, G.A.S. ‘Coal and Climate Change’, Forthcoming in WIREs Climate Change. © 2019  
Reprinted by permission of Wiley. 
 
DRAFT MANUSCRIPT: Not for citation or distribution Page 16 of 23 
viewed empirically with reference to coal (Bulkeley et al., 2014). The solution in principle 
might be to more deeply embed the notion of common responsibility, as Chakrabarty (2014) 
advocates, but in practice this appears to be a somewhat utopian view of the possibilities of 
climate politics. For instance, Moss (2016) argues that accounting for Scope 3 (extra-territorial) 
emissions as well as its Scope 1 and 2 (intra-territorial) emissions from coal and gas would 
nearly triple Australia’s per capita emissions, making it the world’s top polluter on a per capita 
basis. This implies a very different level of responsibility than that based on notions of historical 
responsibility, though the situation is complicated by the fact that most of Australia’s coal 
projects are majority foreign-owned (Pearse, 2009) – raising questions about the ultimate as 
well as proximate beneficiaries of continued coal exploitation there.  
The academic literature has tended to agree with the IEA’s prognosis that the future of coal will 
be decided in the developing world as the developed world continues to transition away from 
coal, a point reinforced by the emergence at COP23 of the Powering Past Coal Alliance 
(Cardoso and Turhan, 2018; Green, 2018a).12 But it is reasonable to expect that justice will 
remain a powerful action frame for both proponents and opponents of coal going forward, 
wherever in the world they happen to be. Debates about coal in the context of climate change 
are therefore frequently (perhaps always) proxy debates about development, about justice, and 
about sustainability which are coloured by the interests of actors with overlapping and often 
contradictory interests. This both supports and raises questions about Kyllönnen’s radical 
argument that Rawlsian fairness demands civil disobedience in the context of fossil fuel 
infrastructure, drawing on protests in the UK to argue for “climate stability as an indispensable 
global public good, whose provision over time requires not only global but intergenerational 
cooperation” and that “plans to build a new coal-fired power station in a developed country 
may justifiably be held as a clear violation of these fair terms [of atmospheric cooperation]” 
(Kyllönen, 2014: 605, 610). For Pearse, the choice was a stark one a decade ago: with such a 
high proportion of Australian coal exported, the moral and environmental necessity is that the 
industry must close: “The choice facing Australia is what type of sunset that will be: a long one 
that fuels catastrophic climate change, or a short one that fights it. It is undoubtedly one of the 
biggest decisions this country will face.” (Pearse, 2009: 66). Pearse’s conclusion points to the 
centrality of justice as both a motivator of action and an outcome of appropriate action: 
“Ultimately, however, the decision to withdraw from the coal trade is a moral one. It recognises 
that not everything that is profitable is desirable, and sees dealing with our greatest carbon 
liability as being in the long-term interests of the nation and the world” (Pearse, 2009: 68).  
Conclusion:	The	future	of	coal?	
Starting with the question ‘What is the future of coal in the context of climate change?’, this 
paper has focussed on the changing dynamics of coal exploitation in the context of climate 
change. It has surveyed the political economy and politics of coal extraction, use and trade in 
the context of consensus about climate change. There is a clear need for focussed research in 
this area, particularly given the role of coal in shaping the future of global energy and questions 
the ongoing utilization and extraction of coal, which is still expanding in some regions. It has 
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called for continued work on the locally situated politics of coal and the political economy of 
coal, suggesting that more explicit climate change framings would strengthen these bodies of 
work. The possibilities for the future of coal are radically divergent, as illustrated by work on 
supply-side climate policy and CCS; the former calls for a rapid and complete transition away 
from coal, the latter very little change in production or consumption. But underlying all of them 
is the clear sense that coal sits at the centre of questions not only about how to respond to 
climate change justly, but how to promote development which is both sustainable and just.  
All the bodies of work reviewed, on the locally situated politics of coal, the political economy 
of coal, and the potentials and pitfalls of supply side interventions to reduce coal extraction and 
even the technological solutions proposed with CCS raise questions either implicitly or 
explicitly about justice. There is a critical need for normatively-engaged and reflexive work on 
coal in the context of climate change, because in the final analysis, the politics of coal is the 
politics of climate justice. 
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